“When relations with Iraqi Kurds are bad, so are relations with Turkey’s own Kurds,” Henri J. Barkey, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C., told the Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review in an interview. “The Iraqi Kurds have a calming effect on Turkish Kurds; they are more experienced and savvy and in many ways represent the best hope all Kurds have for a peaceful and honorable existence.”

After previously spearheading opposition to Barazani’s Regional Kurdish Administration, Turkey is making a 180-degree turn and developing close economic and political ties with northern Iraq, Barkey wrote in his May report on Turkey’s new engagement with Iraq, “Embracing Iraqi Kurdistan.”

Just a few years ago, Barkey said, Turkish officials referred to Barazani and　Iraqi President Jalal　Talabani as “tribal leaders.” Now, Turkey is collaborating with Barazani’s administration on a wide range of issues, including efforts to pacify the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK.

“The more Turkey normalizes its relations with the [Regional Kurdish Administration], the easier it will be to work in Iraq and to work on the domestic Kurdish question,” Barkey told the Daily News. “Hence protecting the well being of Iraqi Kurdistan is important to all Kurds and not just to those in Iraq.”

According to the scholar’s May report, Turkey’s ability to influence events on the ground is greatest in northern Iraq, while the collapse of the government’s Kurdish reform proposals at home could have serious ramifications for relations with Iraq.

“It would both obviate the PKK’s need to demilitarize itself and, more importantly, lead to increased violence in Turkey’s Kurdish areas, which would complicate Ankara-Arbil relations,” the report added.

The PKK has been recognized as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States and the European Union.

The realization that the Regional Kurdish Administration is here to stay first prompted the dramatic change in Turkish-Iraqi Kurdish ties, Barkey said, adding that Turkish-Iraqi relations could not improve without an improvement in relations with Barazani’s administration, which is now an important and recognized part of a federal Iraq.

Turkey realized it could not make any advances on its own Kurdish problem without first improving relations with the administration in northern Iraq, the scholar said.

Despite the increasing number of attacks by the PKK in Turkish territory, Barkey believes the development is unlikely to poison Ankara’s ties with Iraqi Kurdish leaders.

“Ever since the improvement in relations, Ankara has been very careful not to say something overly dramatic and vice versa,” he said. “Everyone is aware of how quickly things can disintegrate. Self restraint seems to be the order of the day.”

A scenario frequently discussed behind the scenes is what Turkey would do if an internal conflict between Kurds and Arabs occurred in Iraq. “This is a difficult question; the devil is in the details,” Barkey said, adding that he presumes Ankara would want to make sure that something like this does not happen.

“The more integrated the [Regional Kurdish Administration] becomes with Turkey, the more interested Turkey will be in its welfare and future,” Barkey said. “If the dispute is about oil, then it is quite possible Turkey will side with Arbil.　If the issue is strictly over ethnicity, then Ankara may side with the Arabs, but in a lukewarm fashion.”